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views in the sciences, the humanities, history, and the like. This is something Mitchell does not address in this book, though he has elsewhere,
particularly in The Justification of Religious Belief. But we should realize
that the issue lies just below the surface.
Otherwise, one might complain that the middle ground he favors is
often characterized too unspecifically to give much useful guidance.
Where we find partisans of opposite extremes it is always plausible to
suggest that there must be some mediating position that accommodates
the valid insights of both sides while avoiding the excesses of each. But
actually doing the job is another matter. I have quoted Mitchell as presenting, on one or another issue, some suggestions as to the form a middle position might take, but one may be pardoned for wanting some
more substantial working out of such a position. But such a reaction
would amount to wishing the author had written another book instead.
What Mitchell has set out to do in this book is to address fundamental
questions concerning the relation of faith and criticism, not develop a
formulation of the faith that results from the actual deployment of such
criticism. This is, if you like, meta-critical faith, not the first-level article.
As with all meta-inquiries, many will be dissatisfied with the level of
abstractness it exhibits. But long philosophical experience clearly indicates that meta-investigations can guide and illuminate first level work
in the trenches. So let us be thankful for the wise counsel contained in
this book and profit from it when we undertake tasks of the sort upon
which it is a reflection.

Making Sense of Your Freedom: Philosophy for the Perplexed by James W.
Felt. S.J. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv and 110.
$28.95 (cloth); $9.95 (paper).
EDWARD POLS, Bowdoin College
Professor Felt's work is a remarkably clear and sometimes brilliant exercise in what William James called popular philosophy. James himself
often wrote or lectured in that mode, and probably nowhere more brilliantly than in his "The Dilemma of Determinism," which Felt cites and
quotes. Felt's book, in its clarity, wit, and the vividness of its concrete
examples, reminds me of that side of James. But to speak of Making Sense
of Your Freedom as an exercise in popular philosophy means only that it
is not addressed solely to an audience of professional philosophers. The
book is clearly the product of a subtle mind, one that has managed to
say something striking about many aspects of this difficult and important problem. The book has an admirable unity and pace, and it can be
read with profit by professionals working in the fields of philosophy
and religion.
The freedom that interests Felt, he tells us in chapter 1, manifests itself
in the very act of choosing: it is, he says, the "characteristic or quality of a
human act, specifically of the interior act of deciding to respond in some
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particular way to the given situation" (p. 2). He calls this internal freedom
and contrasts it with Locke's well-known freedom to do what one has
decided (or what one wants) to do. Felt calls Locke's view external freedom. Internal freedom, he claims, is evident; "What is evident cannot
strictly speaking be demonstrated," he remarks tellingly, "not because it
is not the case, but on the contrary because it is evident" (p. 4). Acts that
are free, in this internal sense, are those for which we are morally responsible-responsible because the act originates within the self.
Determinism is the doctrine which purports to show that freedom, in
this internal sense, is impossible, so determinism becomes Felt's primary
critical target. He defines it in chapter 2: "Determinism is the doctrine that for
every event E there is a previous event or set of events D that guarantees the
occurrence of E" (p. 7, emphasis in original). He distinguishes four varieties-physical determinism, psychological determinism, logical determinism (i.e., fatalism), and rational determinism-and sketches the arguments for each of them, noting that there is some overlap in his categories.
Before taking up the arguments against these forms of determinism,
Felt turns aside, in chapter 3, to consider compatibilism-the doctrine
that determinism is compatible with freedom and perhaps necessary for
it. It is a rich chapter, and my treatment of it must be selective. Felt
begins by dismissing summarily a form of compatibilism that does not
insist that internal freedom (libertarianism), is compatible with determinism but only that Locke's external freedom is compatible with a
determinism that excludes internal freedom. Felt's dismissal of this kind
of compatibilism is straightforward and clear: the real issue is between
internal freedom and determinism, so this form of compatibilism misses
the point. He then discusses compatibilism of the kind which argues that
though we are determined, we could in a certain situation have done
otherwise if we had in fact wanted to. The assumption of that version of
compatibilism is that if we can propound an alternative in terms of
"might have been," then we have a viable sense of freedom to correlate
with our determinism. Felt argues that this is an illusory sense of freedom. Granted the truth of determinism, which is necessary to compatibilism, any alternative we imagine involving different motives, different
circumstances, or both, is no genuine alternative; at best it provides only
the external freedom Felt has already dismissed.
Felt's account and criticism of the version of compatibilism which
argues that there is no moral responsibility without determinism brings
us in sight of his own position. Here he relies on a version of Aristotle's
doctrine of responsibility, which hold that our acts do indeed follow
from our characters but that our characters are in turn gradually developed by virtue of our responsible acts. This view of responsibility, Felt
claims, is compatible with internal freedom. He also points out that compatibilists in general suppose that the only causal alternative to determinism is pure chance: they are unable to see that when one invokes
freedom, one invokes a causal principle rather than pure chance-a more
ample causal principle, however, than compatibilists are willing to recognize (pp. 28-30).
From Felt's arguments against his four kinds of determinism in chap-
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ters 4 and 5, I single out the one against logical determinism, or fatalism.
The topic has been much written about, often enough in terms of
Aristotle's famous discussion of "the sea battle tomorrow" in De
Illterpretatione, which is also Felt's point of departure (pp. 41-42). He
brings this difficult matter as close to his readers as it can be brought in
so short a book: there are many concrete examples, and they are happily
woven into the argument. The argument itself turns on (a) four assertions about truth and the future (pp. 43, 47, 49, 53) and (b) three principles of being and becoming (pp. 56-57).
The positive-as distinct from critical-part of Felt's book is a doctrine of causality designed to show that the agent's freedom consists in
an exercise of causality rather than in the absence of causality (chaps. 6,
7, 9). The three principles just mentioned are central to that doctrine, so I
give here the simplified version of them Felt gives in chapter 9: "(A) The
past is definite and settled .... (B) The present creates the definiteness of new set-

tled actuality out of a width of possibility for incorporating the past .... (C)
Only the activity of real agents creates the definiteness of settled actuality" (pp.
101-2). Felt's use of the principles depends upon the distinction he
makes, in chapter 6, between subject-time, the time experienced by
agents, and object-time, the time of the physicist. This chapter owes
something to St. Augustine and something to Bergson. The free causality
of agency, Felt says, has the same temporal structure as that of lived
time, or subject-time: it "takes time but is not itself temporally divisible"
(p. 84). What Felt calls subject-time I prefer to call act-temporality and to
insist on a metaphorical applicability of such temporality to the causality
operative in nature in general. I do not think Felt would disagree with
that, but the expression 'subject-time' suggests a more radical cleft
between the causality of agents and the causality of the rest of nature
than I think he has in mind. But this is perhaps no more than a terminological disagreement. As one who has argued, over many years, that if
we are to understand human nature we must develop a more ample
doctrine of causality, one in which human action itself is exemplary, I
welcome the appearance of this compact and accessible book. An earlier
version of chapter 8, "Becoming, Freedom, and the Problem of Evil,"
appeared in this journal (I [1984], 370-77).

The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, by John Martin Fischer.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. Pp ix and 273. $21.95.
TED A. WARFIELD, University of Notre Dame
John Fischer has been an active participant in discussions of freedom,
determinism, foreknowledge, and moral responsibility for nearly two
decades. Fischer's articles and anthologies on freedom and determinism, freedom and foreknowledge, and moral responsibility are a tremendous resource to philosophers working on these topics. In this wideranging and clearly written book, Fischer adds to this already impres-

